Fig. 12-1 COBRA seal applied plastic optical-fiber

Fig. 12-2 Specific inherent photo pattern of a COBRA seal The COBRA seal is under development to resolve the problem of currently used type E metallic seals that require many days to verify its integrity. After the COBRA seal is affixed to the nuclear material container, a part of the opical-fiber is cut by a special cutter. A specific inherent optical pattern as shown in Photo 12-2, can be observed on the cross section of bundled optical-fiber. This pattern is registered. An automatic verification device for the pattern is under development by JAERI.

Fig. 12-3 Practical site for photo surveillance camera

Fig. 12-4 Surveillance camera COSMOS developed by JAERI For older photo surveillance cameras, development of the film and verification work of the picture required much time. That problem is being solved. The COSMOS surveillance camera was developed by JAERI with the cooperation of the SONY company. The IAEA has been setting this camera at many facilities around the world since 1994. The COSMOS design is based on the 8 mm VIDEO camera. Some 20,000 scenes are recorded one by one during a three month period. The next development will be to apply a computer for the picture verification work. This will allow quick verification while inspectors are at the facility.

Today, the electricity generated by the fission energy of uranium, plutonium, or both is being used as commonly as water and gas in everyday life. Uranium and plutonium are called fissionable materials or nuclear materials. They are also used as raw materials for nuclear weapons. To dispel fears of nuclear proliferation (nuclear weapons) activities, all peaceful activities involving U and P must be open for international inspection at any time. This is known as the international safeguards system. As the one of technical methods for proving peaceful usage of U&P in Japan, the inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA: an organization of the United Nations) and the Japanese government are making safeguards inspections of all Japanese facilities that have nuclear materials. Note that all nuclear materials in Japan are subject to safeguards inspection. The numbers of facilities, the kinds of materials, the different chemical and physical forms, the quantities, etc., however, are large and complex. The verification of all materials, one by one, is very difficult. Therefore, as a technical and rational method to manage this problem, some nuclear materials for example, fresh fuel for a reactor before being shipped, that are not often moved can have their containers sealed. In the next inspection, the integrity of the seal only need be verified by inspectors. This seal verification activity reduces the number of detailed measurements and accounting efforts to identify illegal handling or stealing of nuclear materials. Furthermore, special cameras photograph all human access to nuclear materials and the handling work involving nuclear materials. Inspectors will check the all photographs to determine if there has been illegal handling or some changes made involving nuclear materials. All such actions will be recorded continuously on photographs. Surveillance cameras are now being installed in nuclear facilities. Both the containment seal and the surveillance device have been, and will continue to be developed and improved to comply with the rationalization of the international safeguards inspections. The seal and surveillance camera were developed and improved by the Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute and a Japanese electronics company. The U.S. Sandia National Laboratory under the Japan Support Program for IAEA also contributed to these efforts. The seals and surveillance cameras are being installed as international safeguards tools around the world.

Reference Y. Yamamoto et al., Development of Electronic Verifier of COBRA Seal, IAEA-SM-333/46 (1994). T. Mukaiyama et al., Development of Compact CCTV Surveillance System "COSMOS", IAEA-SM-333/47 (1994).

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